Introduction
The role of indirect network effects is emerging as an important source of strategic advantage in the marketing of many high-tech products. Indirect network effects arise when the benefit from using a product increases with the use of a complementary set of compatible goods. For instance, demand for hardware and device technologies is often driven substantially by the variety of available complementary software applications. This inter-dependence in demand generates a feedback mechanism, or virtuous cycle. Higher demand for hardware stimulates software sales and profits, leading to a greater supply of software. Increased software availability, in turn, enhances the value of the hardware leading to subsequent adoption. Consequently, hardware demand is indirectly linked to the size of the installed base, generating a form of demand-side economies-of-scale. When firms offer competing incompatible technology standards exhibiting indirect network effects, we often observe "fights to the death" where a single standard emerges victorious (see Shapiro & Varian 1999 for a thorough discussion of markets with network effects) 2 . The ability to measure such indirect network effects is crucial to firms competing in such high-tech industries.
We develop a model that captures the inter-dependence between hardware and software demand in a competitive environment with differentiated technologies. From this model, we derive an econometric framework with which to measure empirically the size of indirect network effects. We model hardware demand as a nested logit demand system. Measurable product characteristics capture the differentiation amongst alternative devices, whereas the nesting structure captures differentiation amongst different hardware technology standards available in the market. Rather than model the indirect network effect in an ad hoc manner, we derive the effect of compatible software availability and variety on hardware demand by explicitly modeling consumer demand for software. We then derive the resulting equilibrium entry and software provision (i.e. supply) decisions of independent software vendors.
Combining hardware demand and software supply, we obtain an equilibrium relationship between software variety and hardware sales. In equilibrium, the degree of software provision varies linearly with the (log of the) installed base of compatible hardware. The derived software supply and hardware demand equations form the basis of our econometric framework. This system enables us to measure the economic relationship between hardware sales and the hardware installed base -the network effect -empirically.
Estimating the structural parameters of the software supply equation enables us to conduct policy experiments with which we can evaluate the relative importance of hardware attributes versus network effects in driving hardware sales.
An important feature of the estimation procedure is the control for the potential endogeneity of software variety on the hardware demand-side, and the hardware installed base on the software supplyside. In particular, software provision depends on total cumulative demand for hardware and, at the same time, total current demand for hardware depends on software availability. Since software variety and hardware sales are determined simultaneously, rather than sequentially in the market, we face a simultaneity problem that we handle using instrumental variables. Although we do not model hardware supply explicitly, we are careful to control for potential price endogeneity associated with strategic hardware pricing. On the hardware-demand side, we also control for the fact that market software availability could be correlated with unobserved product attributes that shift hardware demand but are not observed by the econometrician. We fit the model described above to data for hardware and software in the US market for personal digital assistants (PDAs). In the PDA industry, indirect network effects arise as consumers derive benefits from the variety of software available for a particular hardware product 3 . The importance of this effect can be seen in the trade-press, which reports that the availability of third-party software is playing an increasingly important role in consumers' PDA purchase decisions:
" [2001] was a great year for handhelds, which ultimately resulted in a blockbuster year for portable software," said Steve Koenig, senior software analyst, NPD Techworld. "Consumers discovered that handhelds have more functionality than storing a calendar and contacts. They have become a direct extension of the PC."
Similarly, Handango.com, the largest online reseller of handheld software, ran a repeat buyer survey and reported that 81.9% of repeat mobile [handheld] software buyers have installed six or more handheld applications and that 52.7% of repeat software buyers have installed 11 or more handheld applications on their devices. The study further reports the number of applications installed on the handheld device as the leading source of brand loyalty amongst a list of more than 20 factors. 4 Other statistics indicate that the average buyer in 2002 purchased 2.15 third-party applications from Handango 5 .
To quantify the relative importance of the PDA hardware and software markets, the market research firm NPD (2002) reports that retail revenues from PDA software sales more than doubled in 2001 to $27 million (versus $12 million in 2000). These revenues correspond to the sale of around 900,000 units of software sold through brick-and-mortar retail channels during 2001 (versus 225,000 units in 2000) 6 . Unfortunately, comparable data are not available for online sales, which constitute a large portion of total handheld software sales. Nevertheless, we obtain an approximation of the extent of online sales by noting that as of July 2002, there were 20,578,827 downloads of branded (nonshareware/freeware) PDA software on download.com, one of the largest providers of online software on the internet. If 50% of these downloads convert into purchases, we obtain roughly 11 million units of software sold across both channels. At the same time, the hardware installed base is 11.2 million at the end of July 2002, indicating that demand for PDA software from consumers is significant.
In addition to network effects, another interesting feature of the PDA industry is the standards war between the incompatible Palm and Microsoft O/S formats. If indirect network effects are indeed strong in this environment, then understanding the link to software could be crucial for success in the hardware market. Independent software providers have an incentive to create software compatible with the most profitable technology standard, which is directly related to the size of the installed base. The Palm Co. lists software availability as the third most important reason to choose the Palm O/S, after 4 including PDAs. Unlike much of this previous research, we use data both for the hardware (PDAs) and the related applications (software). Furthermore, we model the equilibrium determination of software availability explicitly, which enables us to measure the indirect network effects structurally. This approach has several advantages over simply plugging the installed base as a variable into the hardware demand system. This latter approach could confound direct and indirect network effects. It could also capture spurious serial correlation in hardware demands. From the perspective of a hardware manager, the approach would not help understand the potential benefits from investing resources in increasing the provision of related software and applications. Finally, we find that accounting for the joint endogeneity of hardware sales and software availability has important implications for obtaining a valid unbiased measure of the network effects.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We first provide a brief description of the PDA industry and our data in section 2. We present our model and derive the hardware sales and software provision equations that we employ in estimation in section 3. In section 4, we present the results from our estimations and discuss their significance. Section 5 provides discussion and applications of the results. Section 6 concludes.
2.
PDA industry and data PDA-s or Personal Digital Assistants are a good example of a high-technology durable that has been rapidly adopted by the US population in the 90-s 10 . Due to wide differentiation, consumer adoption of PDA-s involves consideration of a broad range of attributes. Key factors include the Operating System (O/S), brand, random access memory (RAM), processor clock speed, screen size, resolution, memory configurations, expansion capabilities, form factor, 11 and availability of third party software. Of these, choosing the operating system is probably the most important decision. Currently, the Palm and Microsoft 10 For an interesting history of PDA-s and their development, see Bayus, Jain & Rao (1997). 11 The form factors available currently include tablets and clamshells. Tablets are smaller, personal organizers typically entailing touch-screen/pen input. Clamshells are smaller versions of notebooks, with larger displays, and typically allowing both keyboard and pen input.
(MS) O/S are the two dominant standards in the industry 12 . Competition in the market is intense, with both the O/S standards and the brands compatible with each of the standards competing with each other for consumer adoption.
Hardware data
Our hardware data consists of SKU-level monthly sales and prices of all PDA models sold through the retail channel in the US from January 1999 to July 2002. These data are collected by NPD
Techworld using point-of-sale scanners linked to over 80% of the consumer-electronics retail ACV in the US. After removing models corresponding to brands with insignificant overall market-shares (<1%), the data contained 2068 model-month observations of 132 different models across 43 months. These Table 1 .
Overall, Palm O/S PDA-s -Handspring, Palm and Sony -have a combined share of 90.43% of the total unit sales in the data during the 43 month period. Detailed attribute data for each of the 132 models were manually collected from online sources and trade publications, and cross-checked with manufacturer model descriptions for consistency. 
Software data
To model the effects of software availability on hardware sales, we need to develop a measure of the benefit provided by compatible third party software applications to PDA owners in their use of the PDA. An ideal measure would be an index of utility that consumers obtain from use of compatible software in each period. To estimate such an index, we would need data on sales, prices, and "quality" of software. These data are unavailable to us. On the other hand, summarizing the benefit by collecting data on all software titles available in the market for each O/S is not feasible either, due to the large number of third-party applications currently available for PDA-s. For this reason, we follow the approach adopted in previous literature (cf. Gandal, Kende & Rob 2000) and develop an alterative index of software availability.
We collected data on all software available at download.com compatible with the Palm and MS O/S. The download.com website has information on when a particular software title was uploaded to their database, and the total number of downloads of that software title to date. From these data, we created an index of availability by counting only those software titles that were purchased by consumers (PDA shareware/freeware are thus excluded) and downloaded at least once a day (roughly 80% of the total titles). This serves as an estimate of the availability of "important" software of both formats 16 . The plot of software availably for both the Palm and MS O/S is presented in figure 2 . The plot indicates that consistent with our expectation, more software is available for the Palm O/S than for the MS O/S in the 15 A hedonic regression of (log) model prices on brand fixed effects and model attributes had an R 2 of 0.676. An appendix with a history of the PDA industry, detailed descriptive statistics of model attributes and results from the hedonic price regression is available on request from the authors. 16 Download.com offers more than 200,000 freeware and shareware titles on its website and currently facilitates an estimated 150,000 software downloads every day. The CNET network, which owns download.com, has agreements in place with around 20 Internet Service Providers to make download.com the default software downloading service on the Web browsers they are distributing to their customers (http://www.cnet.com/aboutcnet/0-13613-7-850335.html). For these reasons, trial-versions of most newly released software are made available at the website by software vendors hoping to entice users to buy their products. Thus, we consider the availability of software there as a reasonable representation of market software variety.
marketplace. Both curves show exponential growth of software variety. From an alternate source, we also obtained data on the total number of software titles available (across both formats) at a major outlet for software titles for PDA-s since 1999. The pattern of software available from this dataset also looks very similar to the download.com data, which we construe as face validity for our software index. *** Figure 2 here*** A comprehensive analysis of firm entry and pricing decisions in the PDA software sector would require additional data such as the fixed costs of software development and software prices in each timeperiod. These data are unavailable. Manually collecting software price data is not feasible due to the large number of software titles available in the market, and due to the fact that historical price data are extremely difficult to obtain. These data limitations on the software side require us to make simplifying assumptions in modeling the software entry and pricing decisions of firms. The model frameworks for the hardware and software markets and the assumptions employed are presented in the next section. Our goal is to develop a simple model that captures the key features of complementary network good markets while recognizing the limitations of our data.
Model formulation
We first provide a brief overview of the model and a discussion of some of our main assumptions.
In the following subsections, we provide formal details and derivations of hardware demand and software provision.
On the demand side, consumers adopt a PDA system consisting of two components: hardware and software. In each period, potential consumers either purchase one unit of the hardware technology or choose not to purchase in the category. Hardware is treated as a differentiated product, and extant hardware technologies are incompatible with each other. Consumers who purchase the hardware also purchase compatible software from the set of available software titles. We assume that consumers who make a hardware purchase subsequently exit the potential market for hardware; but could continue to purchase software of the selected standard in future periods.
Over time, we observe newer and better products appearing in the market. While we capture such hardware innovations through the changing product attribute levels in our data, we do not model new hardware introduction decisions explicitly. We do model the changing availability of software over time, whereby increases in the installed base of hardware induce more software firms to enter the market over time, resulting in more software variety.
In modeling the software industry, we incorporate several features of our data. First, we assume there are a large number of independent software vendors whose software products for a given technology standard are differentiated, albeit closely related substitutes 17 . We do not consider vertically integrated software firms because, based on our reading of the trade press, we believe that third party software vendors provide most handheld software titles available for users 18 . We also assume software vendors have common knowledge about software costs and demand, and there is free entry into the industry 19 . We first solve for the profit-maximizing price of a representative firm. We then search for a symmetric price equilibrium. To solve for the corresponding equilibrium number of firms, we use the free-entry condition, which implies zero profits in equilibrium. The derived equilibrium number of software titles is found to depend on the installed base of the hardware in each period. This equilibrium relationship forms our software provision equation in the empirical model.
As noted above, we lack data on fixed and marginal costs of software provision. We assume that each software firm produces a software product with a constant marginal cost and a fixed cost that is common to all firms producing software for a given hardware technology. The uniform fixed cost assumption implies that software vendors supporting a given technology face roughly comparable man-hours of software development, which form a significant portion of software fixed costs. However, we cannot rule out differences in fixed costs reflecting the amount of software development support that hardware firms might provide to independent software vendors wishing to develop software for their technology 20 . To control for these differences, we include time and technologyspecific fixed-effects in the software provision equation.
In each period, consumers purchase some units of the available models of the hardware product.
Consumers who purchase the hardware then purchase complementary compatible software. Software firms enter the market. All software firms then sell their software to consumers who have adopted compatible hardware. By assumption, all these moves occur simultaneously. Figure 3 captures the various interrelationships and summarizes the modeling framework graphically.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. We first describe consumer preferences for hardware and software in the next subsection. We derive a demand equation for hardware sales from this model in section 3.2. We then present the profit function for a representative software firm. By adding a free-entry condition, we develop an equation for market software provision in section 3.3. Finally, in section 3.4, we describe the procedure for estimating the hardware demand equation and the software provision equation.
Consumer preferences
The consumer's decision process is as follows. In a given time-period t, each consumer makes a discrete choice from among 1 t J + hardware alternatives available to him in that time-period. Here,
indexes the hardware models available in the market at time t, and 0 j = corresponds to the decision not to purchase PDA hardware. If the consumer chooses to purchase a model, he then purchases complementary software from among the set of compatible software titles available in the market. We implicitly assume that consumers behave myopically at the time of the hardware decision. In choosing a system type, they only consider current software availability and not the net present value of future software purchases. Note, once a consumer selects the hardware, he effectively commits to a system, or technology standard. In future periods, he could continue to purchase software compatible with this U the consumer's benefit from the compatible software. Thus, the consumer's utility from adopting the hardware/software system, j-f, at time t, ijft U , is:
where , 1,.., To derive the indirect utility of system j-f we first derive the consumer's indirect utility from use of compatible software conditional on purchase of a hardware product in time t. Suppose the consumer 21 We assume that no new technologies are introduced in the periods under consideration. That is, ℑ is the same for all time periods. Of course, the number of models of each hardware technology in the market varies over time.
has purchased model j (compatible with technology f). Letting kft ρ denote the price of software k in time t, his demand for compatible software for model j, ( ) 
We assume that preferences for software variety. Thus, we assume:
where,
is a quantity index, and ( ) ( )
> is an increasing and concave function of ift Q . The parameter β relaxes the perfect substitutability of the model so that consumers can purchase positive quantities of each of the software titles available. Given the above functional form, the consumer's optimal demand for software k,
is a price index for the software 22 . By allowing for ( ) . ν , we introduce decreasing marginal returns from software variety into the CES utility. Further, we get the property that the optimal demand of software,
x (equation 4.1), is decreasing in the variety of software. Therefore, as 22 The derivation is available from the authors upon request.
more software titles are provided in the market due to increases in the hardware installed base, the perconsumer demand for software decreases, thus allowing more hardware sales to result in more software titles in the market in equilibrium. In essence, ( ) . ν drives the indirect network effect in the model.
Given the symmetric demands for software in (4.1), and an assumption that all third party software vendors face identical costs, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which all software firms charge the same price, ρ (see section 3.3). With identical software prices, the demand for software becomes:
( ) 
where, ( )
After accounting for the software provision equilibrium, the consumer's utility from purchasing a hardware model depends on the stand-alone benefit from the model, his income, the price of the hardware and a power function of the variety of compatible software available in the market for that hardware technology. In the next subsection, we derive the corresponding hardware demand system.
Hardware demand
Let model j compatible with technology f be marketed under the brand name b, ( ) 
is also an extreme value random variable. Substituting this specification of hardware utility into (6), we obtain the following expression for overall PDA conditional indirect utility from model j:
This takes the form of a familiar nested logit with ℑ +1 nests corresponding to the various technologies available and nesting parameter σ . Note the outside good ( 0 j = ) forms the only member of nest 0 23 .
To further allow for unobserved heterogeneity in tastes for brands, we assume that the intrinsic brand preferences have the following normal distribution in the population:
We can write the unconditional probability, jt q , that a consumer chooses model j in time-period t as: 
As is the convention in the literature, we have simplified the notation inside the exponentiated terms to reflect a component that is common across consumers, jt δ , and a component that is consumer-specific, Similarly, the format nests control for correlation in utilities of models with same format, and the nopurchase nest controls for non-IIA switching between inside and outside goods. Finally, the observed product characteristics control for mean differences in shares of models net of brand and technology format. We do not however control for the changing willingness-to-pay of PDA adopters over time.
Modeling these demand dynamics (cf. Song and Chintagunta 2003) is beyond the scope of the paper, and also requires access to further demographic data.
Let t M denote the potential market in time-period t. Given the total market size denoted as M , we calculate t M , the potential market for hardware in month t as t M = M -cumulative PDA unit sales till month t. This reflects the idea that we treat potential consumers as first-time buyers of the hardware, who drop out of the market after purchase 25 .
The expected demand, jt Q , for model j in time-period t is then:
24 ϑ is implicitly the inverse of the scale parameter of the extreme value distribution, and all other parameters are implicitly scaled down by the scale parameter. 25 Replacement sales are ignored -the bias is expected to be small given that our data are for the initial years of this relatively new category, where most retail purchases are made by first-time buyers.
(8.1) and (8.2) together represent the hardware demand equation. In fitting this demand system to PDA sales data, we need to be careful to control for the potential endogeneity of hardware prices and software variety. Although we do not model hardware pricing explicitly, if hardware firms set prices strategically and account for the unobserved (to the econometrician) product features jt ξ each period, prices will be correlated with the error term (see Berry 1994 for a further discussion of this issue). The endogeneity of software variety reflects the simultaneity of software provision and hardware sales in the industry. In the estimation section below, we explain how we control for both these sources of endogeneity using instrumental variables.
We now present the software model and the implied software provision equation.
Software provision
Let ft Y represent the installed base of hardware for technology f at time t. Consider the software firm producing software k compatible with hardware technology f in time-period t. Let its fixed cost be ft F , and its marginal cost be c . Its profit, kft π , is:
( ) From (4.1) we see that the price affects the demand for software both directly and indirectly through its effects on ft Ρ , the price index. As in common in the literature, we assume that due to the large number of software titles available in the market, the indirect effect of price on ft Ρ is negligible and can be ignored 26 . With this assumption, the price elasticity of software demand, kft η , is obtained as
Therefore, the marginal revenue of the software firm is ( ) and identical marginal costs, in equilibrium all software firms charge the same price, ρ .
With free entry, each firm will earn zero (economic) profits. Substituting for ρ and for * ikft x from (4.2) into the profit function in (9) and setting equal to zero, we obtain, (10) to data, we will need to account for the endogeneity of the hardware installed base, which is determined simultaneously by the availability of software.
Model estimation
We now describe the empirical procedure we use to estimate the parameters of the model derived in the previous section. The equations to be estimated are:
• the hardware demand equation (8.1 and 8.2): We conduct estimation in two steps. First, we fit the hardware demand equation to recover consumer taste parameters. Then, we fit the software provision equation to recover the parameters describing the relationship between software availability and hardware installed base. The fact that we do not estimate hardware and software demand jointly could lead to inefficient estimates if the respective error terms jt ξ and ft υ are correlated. Differences in the dimensionality of these two error terms would complicate joint estimation. Furthermore, we found no evidence of correlation between these two error terms based on the estimates we report below. A second source of efficiency loss comes from the potential estimation of the common parameters, α and β , across equations. In the current context, we are not specifically interested in these parameters, but rather in the net effect of software variety on hardware demand ( γ and δ ) and the effect of the hardware installed base on software provision (ϕ ). Hence, we carry-out estimation of these two equations sequentially.
Hardware demand equation
Using the demand system in (8.1) and (8.2), we can write the expected market share for hardware model j at time t, jt s , by dividing through by the total potential market size, t M : 
In (11) A concern with estimating (11) via non-linear least squares is the potential correlation between the unobserved product characteristics, jt ξ , and the observed hardware prices and software availability.
Analogous to Berry (1994), we first invert (11) we evaluate the integrals in (11) via Monte Carlo simulation and, hence, we simulate the expression 27 Since we have a nested logit model, we modify the contraction mapping to invert for the weighted mean utility: (10), we see that market software variety depends on current hardware sales (through the installed base). Hence observable hardware product attributes are valid instruments for market software variety. Thus, the set of instruments that we used are squared terms and interactions of own RAM, speed, weight and area, number of models of the hardware technology available in the market. 28 The validity of these instruments requires us to assume the attributes are uncorrelated with the error term.
For instance, we must assume hardware firms do not set PDA observed attributes and the unobserved characteristic jointly. This identifying assumption has been made in the extant literature (e.g. BLP 1995), and is partially motivated by the difficulty in obtaining better instruments.
For estimation, we use the sample analog of the moment conditions:
where J is the number of unique models in the data, and 
Software provision equation
We use the reduced-form of the equilibrium number of software firms, derived in section 3.3, as the basis for our software provision regression:
The software provision equation is a log-linear regression with an endogenous explanatory variable (the installed base) which we estimate using two-stage least squares. We use the sum of characteristics of all models compatible with a given technology format -number of models, and sum of RAM, speed, weight and area of models of the technology format -as instruments. 30 We assume ft κ in (10) to be composed of a format-specific term and a time-period specific term. Thus, for the software provision equation, we 29 Maritz: "Thompson Lightstone US only segmentation study", March 2002, http://news.cnet.com/investor/news/newsitem/0-9900-1028-20844730-0.html. 30 The first-stage R 2 value for the regression of the (log of the) installed base on the instruments was 0.9253. estimate a constant, 42 time-period fixed effects, a Palm O/S fixed effect and the coefficient on hardware installed base.
Results

Hardware demand
We now report the results from three models specifications to assess some of the structure we impose. Our first model consists of an OLS regression based on the log-linearization of (11) . Here, in addition to ignoring heterogeneity in tastes (no brand random effects), we also implicitly assume that software variety enters the demand system linearly. Implicitly, we set δ ∈ ) and control for the endogeneity of prices, software availability, and within-nest share. We estimate this model by GMM. Finally, the firth and sixth columns report the results of our main model, which also incorporates unobserved heterogeneity, and which we estimate using the method of simulated moments procedure described previously. *** Table 3 here*** Looking at the OLS results in table 3, we note that all the parameter results make sense intuitively. The fixed effects are all negative due to the large share of the outside good. The effect of price is negative and significant 31 . Software variety has a positive and significant effect on hardware salespreliminary evidence for a complementary network effect. The positive coefficient on form indicates that on average consumers prefer the tablet form factor for PDA-s to the clamshell form-factor. As expected, the RAM and processor clock-speed have a significant positive effect on hardware sales. Consumers prefer larger face area to lesser area and prefer lighter models to heavier ones on average. PDA-s with color displays are preferred to ones with monochrome displays. The benefit from hardware is also increasing in the number of expansion slots available and in the availability of a built-in modem and lithium batteries. As expected, the holiday effect is significant indicating that seasonality plays an We now present the results for the non-linear model, which controls for endogeneity (columns 3 and 4 in table 3). We see that after using instruments, the effect of software variety is positive and significant, indicating that a higher software variety results in higher hardware sales for that technology.
The estimated value of δ close to 0.5 indicates that the marginal benefit of software variety for consumers is decreasing. The total effect of software variety has also increased after using instruments. This indicates that ignoring the endogeneity of software variety can lead to misleading inferences about its effect on hardware demand. The within-nest coefficient σ is close to 1 and significant indicating that models within a given nest -that is those compatible with a given technology format -are perceived as being fairly homogenous by consumers. The effect of the other observable attributes remain fairly the same as in the OLS case. The coefficients on modem and lithium have changed sign, but are insignificant.
Columns five and six presents the estimates of the full model in which we allow for both decreasing marginal benefits from software variety and unobserved heterogeneity in brand valuations.
The pattern of results from this random-coefficients specification is similar to that from the previous two specifications: software variety is positive and significant; price is negative and significant; σ is close to 
Software provision
Here we present the 2SLS results for estimation of the software provision equation. We check whether the data are consistent with a higher installed base of hardware resulting in higher software variety for that technology in the market. Table 4 presents the results (the constant and the time-period and format specific fixed effects are suppressed). Controlling for time-period and format fixed effects, the effect of hardware installed base is positive and significant, indicating that the data are consistent with a hardware feedback effect 32 .
*** Table 4 here*** To summarize our results at this point, we find evidence for positive feedback from software variety on hardware sales and from hardware installed base on software variety. The results support the anecdotal evidence for complementary network effects in the market for PDA-s. As we see, this effect is fairly robust across model specifications. The implications of these results are that software availability drives adoption of PDA-s, and that brand-managers of PDA products could increase the rate of adoption of their models by encouraging market provision of third-party compatible software. We return to this issue in the subsequent section.
We now discuss the application and implications of these results.
Application and implications of results
Quantifying the network effect
Given the above results, an immediate question that arises for PDA brand-managers is the assessment of the relative importance of the network effect versus the price-quality effect in driving PDA sales. If the availability of third-party software is indeed very important relative to price-quality effects, 32 We did not find evidence of serial correlation on the software provision side. 
The first term on the right-hand side of (12) An interesting question is whether we could still capture the impact of network effects simply by using an appropriate functional form for hardware installed base in the hardware demand equation. In our model, the equilibrium total number of software in the market is indeed related to the hardware installed base through the free entry condition. Hence, the model predicts that the installed base of hardware should always correlate positively with current demand since it contains information about software availability.
Nevertheless, we claim that with indirect network effects, the use of auxiliary data on software variety is superior to using the hardware installed base as a covariate. In most high-technology categories like PDAs where prices are falling over time and sales are rising over time, it is difficult to disentangle whether higher sales reflect lower prices versus network effects. The use of auxiliary software variety data resolves this issue.
The corresponding value to (12) for a model in which we use the installed base as a covariate to capture the network effect is around 68%. This suggests that using a model with the installed base as a variable tends to overstate the extent of network effects in this category relative to our model. Further, this approach does not help us derive implications vis-à-vis the potential benefits on the hardware side from increasing market provision of software. *** Figure 5 here***
We further examine the importance of the network factor using another metric. For this, we first compute the relative shares of Palm and MS O/S compatible PDA-s in the data. We then simulate the total sales of Palm and MS O/S PDA-s that would occur without any compatible third-party software in the market (or equivalently when consumers do not value software variety at all). To do this, we set the effect of software variety in the hardware demand equation (11) If consumers value the attribute highly, then the gains for Palm Co. from the direct effect will be high. If the positive feedback from software is strong, then the gains from the indirect feedback effect will also be high. Additionally, the stronger the direct effect, the stronger will be the indirect effect, since positive feedback in the market implies that any increase in the Palm O/S installed base will be compounded through increased market software provision. Quantifying the extent of the direct and the indirect effects on his and competitors' sales will help the Palm Co. manager obtain a full picture of the effect of an improvement in an attribute. We undertake such an exercise below. As is seen from above, enhancing the attributes of hardware products in markets with positive feedback result in complex self-reinforcing effects that fuel further hardware sales. In such markets, the supply of compatible software can be a significant competitive advantage. Quantifying the extent of direct and indirect effects, and understanding how incremental sales are be achieved can help managers in such markets make better and more improved decisions.
Equivalent software provision
From the above results, it is clear that the availability of compatible software in the market is of value in driving hardware sales. Thus, hardware manufacturers can achieve equivalent increases in sales by providing compatible software in the market, either through vertical integration into software or by providing infrastructure and development support to third party software vendors. To evaluate the tradeoffs, managers need to be able to know the number of incremental software titles required in the market in a given period to achieve the same sales increase as an improvement in a specific attribute. We evaluate this trade-off for the four attribute-enhancements to the Palm V model presented in the previous section. Specifically, for each attribute, we use our model to evaluate the number of software titles that Palm Co. will have to provide in the market in February 1999 (the month of introduction of the Palm V model) to achieve the new Palm Co. sales in July 2002. In doing so, we account for decreasing marginal returns to software variety and for the positive feedback that occurs in the market in all subsequent periods in response to the increased software provision. Table 6 shows the results. We see that Palm Co.
need to provide 224 more titles in the market in Feb '99 to achieve the same unit sales that it would have achieved in July '02, from providing a color display on Palm V. The corresponding numbers for the other attribute-improvements are: 161 for the increase in face area from 14 to 17 sq. inches; 83 for increasing the clock-speed from 16 to 33 MHz, and 19 for providing 2 expansion slots. Given access to the cost of software provision, the manager can use these results to evaluate the trade-offs involved in these strategies.
*** Table 6 here*** Finally, a caveat to the above simulation results is that they do not consider the price responses from the hardware providers to the policy changes. Implicitly, we assume that simulated prices are the same as actual prices. Thus, the results should be interpreted as illustrating the trade-offs inherent in innovating hardware versus providing software, rather than the formal full-equilibrium evaluation of a counterfactual scenario.
Conclusions
We present an econometric framework with which to measure empirically the size of indirect network effects in a competitive market with differentiated technologies. The indirect network effect arises through the inter-dependence between hardware and software demand and supply that we capture in our model. We empirically estimate the model using data on hardware/software in the market for personal digital assistants (PDA-s) in the US. In estimation, we control for the potential endogeneity of software variety on the hardware demand-side, and the hardware installed base on the software supplyside. Our estimated results provide evidence for significant network effects in this market.
To illustrate the strategic importance of nurturing the network, we use the model structure to analyze the growth of the installed bases of Palm and Microsoft, the two dominant PDA hardware technologies, with and without the availability of compatible third party software. We find that lack of third party software negatively impacts the evolution of the installed bases of both formats. These findings suggest PDA hardware firms would benefit from investing resources in increasing the provision of software for their products. We also use the model results to compute the incremental sales achieved from improving PDA attributes. Further, we decompose the incremental hardware sales into a component reflecting quality improvement via the attributes (the direct effect) and a component reflecting positive feedback due to increased software supply (the indirect effect). Finally, we compare the trade-offs of investments in product attributes versus investments in complementary software by measuring the impact of improving model attributes in terms of the equivalent number of software titles. These form important inputs to PDA hardware managers evaluating future strategies for their products.
A potential extension of the paper would be to incorporate the quality of software, rather than just the availability, into the model framework. Though straightforward, estimating such a model would require considerably more data on the software side. Modeling the supply of hardware to understand how hardware product introduction and pricing is related to software availability would also be a useful extension. We do not pursue this line of research in this paper because, a) data on PDA model development costs, R&D expenditures and other information on innovation activity within hardware firms are unavailable, and b) formally modeling the product introduction and pricing decisions of firms require the solution of a dynamic optimization problem which is beyond the scope of this paper. Further, this is outside of our current focus of measuring and understanding the implications of indirect network effects. Nevertheless, we are careful to control for potential price endogeneity associated with strategic hardware pricing within our estimation procedure. Another extension could be to account for the forwardlooking behavior of consumers. Forward-looking consumers could potentially take future software availability into account in deciding on current hardware adoption. However, this issue likely to be of second-order importance for PDA-s since based on our reading of the trade-press and other consumer surveys, we do not expect PDA consumers to worry too much about future software-availability when purchasing hardware. However, for other categories like video-games, where the hardware (consoles) has no functional use without software (games), this effect might be important. Notes: All values in 1000-s of units sold. The Palm V was introduced in Feb '99, was available in the market till the end of the time period of the data (July '02) and accounted for about 3% of the total PDA unit sales in the data. 1 At the end of the last month in data (Jul '02). 2 Total over all months in data (Jan '99-Jul '02). In 1000-s of units. 2 Assumes that the Palm Co. provides these software titles over and above the available Palm O/S-compatible software titles in the market in Feb '99 (the month in which Palm V was introduced). 
